I analyse the relationship between board structure and firm value using a large sample of UK non-financial companies. I expect this relationship to be stronger for low growth firms if the board mitigates the free cash flow problem. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that, for low growth firms, board structure, such as the proportion of non-executive directors and the presence of a non-executive as chairman is significantly related to firm value. In contrast, for high growth firms the relationship between board structure and firm value is weak or negative for the case of the split of the roles of CEO and chairman. The results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms are not homogenous but vary with firm specific factors. I analyse the relationship between board structure and firm value using a large sample of UK non-financial companies. I expect this relationship to be stronger for low growth firms if the board mitigates the free cash flow problem. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that, for low growth firms, board structure, such as the proportion of non-executive directors and the presence of a non-executive as chairman is significantly related to firm value. In contrast, for high growth firms the relationship between board structure and firm value is weak or negative for the case of the split of the roles of CEO and chairman. The results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms are not homogenous but vary with firm specific factors.
I. Introduction
Research on corporate governance has identified a number of mechanisms intended to insure that management teams act in the best interests of shareholders. 1 These include external mechanisms such as institutional ownership, large creditors, long-term relationships, debt financing, and the market for managerial labour, and internal mechanisms which include managerial ownership, executive compensation and the board of directors.
In this paper I focus on the role of the board of directors in controlling the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. This issue is controversial. On the one hand, organisations such as investment funds, stock exchanges, professional bodies and corporate governance task forces, try to impose a "one size fits all" board with majority seats held by non-executive directors and the roles of the chief executive officer and chairman are split. 2 These proposals aim at providing adequate safeguards for investors' capital and reflect the concern about the way in which remuneration packages for senior executives have been determined, the role of the CEO in directors' appointments, the spectacular collapse of a number of large companies and by the fraudulent use of funds such as the use of pension fund of Mirror Group Newspapers to finance an illegal scheme for supporting the share price of Maxwell Communications Corporation. These proposals are also based on academic studies that show that outside directors play a significant role in protecting shareholders' interests when a good decision control, such as management turnover or the adoption of poison pill, is required (e.g., Weisbach, 1988 , Brickley et al., 1994 , and Cotter et al, 1997 and by the proposition that outside directors have incentives to make decisions that signal their abilities as efficient decision-makers (e.g., , Weisbach, 1988 . 3 On the other hand, academic studies show that board composition varies with both firm specific factors and the institutional environment the firm faces (e.g., Brickley and James, 1987 , Denis and Denis, 1994 , and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988 , suggesting that imposing a homogeneous board may be optimal for some firms but not for others. In addition, there is evidence that it is not the board of directors per se that reduces the agency conflicts and creates value, but rather its size, number of meeting and its power. For example, following Jensen (1993) argument that a value-relevant attribute of corporate boards is their size, Yermack (1996) shows that companies with smaller boards have high value. Vafeas (1999) reports a negative relationship between firm value and the number of board meetings. Jensen (1993) , and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) argue that the CEO often ends up controlling the composition of the board and lessening its monitoring role. In this perspective, boards evolve over time as a function of the bargaining power of the CEO, and managers tend to reduce the power of boards as their equity ownership increases (e.g., Denis and Sarin, 1999 , Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 , Mikkelson and Partch, 1997 , Weisbach, 1988 . Franks et al., (1998) show that managers dominate the board and that high managerial turnover rates are confined only to the worse performing firms.
These arguments suggest that boards are not always effective and imposing a single board model for all companies is likely to increase costs and result in a reduction of shareholder wealth. The present study adds to this line of literature by suggesting that the effectiveness of the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the firm's growth characteristics. I test the hypothesis that the significance of the relationship between board structure and value may change depending on firm's growth opportunities. If, as argued by Smith and Watts (1992) , firms with high growth opportunities have greater information asymmetry and greater agency problems, I expect board structure to play a significant role in high growth but not low growth firms. However, if agency problems are associated with conflicts over the use of free cash flow, rather than the information asymmetry, I expect governance mechanisms to play a minor role within high growth firms but a significant role within low growth companies which have usually substantial free cash flow and have a tendency to overinvest by accepting marginal investment projects with negative net present values (Jensen, 1986) . Thus, for these low growth firms, the board is expected to be an important monitoring device. In both information asymmetry and free cash flow cases, I expect board structure to be dependent on firm's growth opportunities. I use three proxy variables for board structure: number of directors, proportion of non-executive directors and the split of the roles of the chief executive officer and chairman. If the board of directors acts as a monitoring device in reducing the free cash flow (information asymmetry) problem, low (high) growth firms are expected to have a low number of directors, a high proportion of non-executive directors on the board and a high probability of splitting the roles of CEO and chairman and a strong relationship is expected between low (high) growth firm value and these three board composition variables.
I analyse the board structure of 1440 UK non-financial listed companies in 1996/97.
For the sample as a whole the average number of directors is 7 of which 43% are non-executive directors, and 55% of the sample firms split the roles of CEO and chairman. The results show that there is no statistical difference between high and low growth firms in the number of directors. However, the composition of the board differs significantly across the two groups.
High growth firms have substantially higher number and proportion of non-executive directors than low growth firms. These high growth companies are also more likely to split the roles of CEO and chairman than low growth companies. However, high growth firms are not more likely to appoint a non-executive director as a chairman and they have similar proportion of shares held by their respective managers and block holders than low growth firms. Further analysis of the relationship between firm value and board structure provides evidence that board monitoring is prevalent only in low growth firms. Although, consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996) the relationship between firm value and number of directors is negative and significant for both sets of firms, the remaining board structure variables are only significant for the case of low growth firms. In particular, the results show that, for low growth firms, there is a strong and positive relationship between firm value and the proportion of nonexecutive directors, the split of the roles of CEO and chairman and the appointment of a nonexecutive director as a chairman while for high growth firms the proportion of non-executive directors and the appointment of a non-executive as a chairman are not significant, and the split of the roles of CEO and chairman is negatively related to firm value. The results simulated for various measures of value and for a smaller sample of 764 UK firms in 1998/99 are qualitatively similar.
The relationship between firm value and managerial ownership is also dependent on firm's growth opportunities. For high growth firms the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is non-linear, optimised at about 40% when managers become entrenched. In contrast, for low growth companies, this relationship is positive and significant.
The results imply that only low growth companies benefit fully from both internal corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and managerial ownership) which aim at reducing the agency costs resulting form the free cash flow problems. High growth companies are likely to adopt a particular internal corporate governance system to mitigate the information asymmetry problem and to help them raise external financing rather than reduce the free cash flow problem. Therefore, imposing the same board structure for all companies independently of their specific characteristics is likely to reduce the value of firms that may be forced to depart from corporate governance structures which have been successful.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next Section presents the theoretical background. Section III describes the data and the methodology. Section IV presents the results and the conclusions are in Section V.
II Theoretical Background
Previous studies find that the size and the composition of the board are correlated with the quality of the board's decisions of CEO replacement, acquisitions, poison pills, and executive compensation. 4 For example, find a positive monotonic relation between the proportion of outside directors and the likelihood that an outside director is appointed as CEO and such an appointment benefits shareholders. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of outside directors is followed by a significant share price increase, even when outside directors already dominate the board. In another study, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) , find that the stock price reaction to the announcement of the appointment of a new inside director depends on the proportion of shares held by the same director. In particular, the reaction is negative when the director owns less than 5%, positive when the director's ownership ranges between 5% and 25%, and it is not significant when the director's ownership exceeds 25%. This suggests that the benefits of the appointment of an inside director exceed the costs of managerial entrenchment only when the interest of managers and outside directors are closely aligned. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find that the adoption of poison pills has a negative effect on share prices only when the board is dominated by insiders, while stock prices react positively when outsiders dominate the board. Weisbach (1988) finds a strong relationship between managerial turnover and performance within firms with outsiderdominated boards. These studies recognise the importance and monitoring effectiveness of outside directors and are consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) arguments that reputation and the threat of legal action motivate outside directors to act in the best interest of shareholders.
However, Jensen (1993) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) argue that CEOs often end up controlling the composition of the board and lessening its monitoring role. They do this by being themselves chairmen and adopting large boards to increase communication problems among board members. Consistent with these arguments, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al., (1998) report a negative relationship between board size and firm value, for large and small firms, respectively. Other studies report that boards appear to evolve over time as a function of the bargaining power of the CEO relative to the existing directors and that managers tend to reduce the monitoring role of boards as soon as their equity ownership increases. Denis and Sarin (1999) , Weisbach (1991), and Weisbach (1988) find that insider ownership is inversely correlated to the proportion of outside directors. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) report an inverse relationship between the stake of directors and officers in the firm and the turnover of directors and top-officers. Similarly, Yermack (1996) reports a negative relationship between CEO stock ownership and the probability that the CEO is replaced. Denis and Denis (1994) find that the rate of top-managers' turnover is about a half in majority-owned, as opposed to widely held, firms. Bhagat and Black (1998) , in their review paper, present a different view on the effectiveness of board composition. They argue that previous studies do not tell us how board composition affects overall firm performance as companies with independent boards could perform better on particular tasks, yet worse on other unstudied tasks, leading to no net advantage in overall performance. In addition, they show that previous results (e.g., Weisbach, 1988) have marginal effects on firm value, while others (e.g., Yermack, 1996) are not strong to the choice of performance measures. Instead, they analyse the relationship between board independence and long-term performance of large firms in the US to find that firms with the most independent boards perform worst that firms with more balanced boards. The relationship between board structure and firm value is also dependent on the testing methodology used. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the inter-relationships among seven "control mechanisms" using a six-equation simultaneous model to find that the proportion of outsiders on the board is significantly negative determinant of firm value but with the three-stage least square method the relationship is insignificant.
The purpose of the paper is to test the hypothesis that the relationship between board structure and firm value is a function of the firm's growth opportunities. I expect the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, and thus the monitoring role of the board of directors, to be a function of firm's growth opportunities. However, the direction of this relationship depends on whether the agency conflicts are created by information asymmetry or free cash flow problem. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with growth opportunities have greater information asymmetry and greater agency problems. Thus, board structure is expected to have a significant role in reducing the agency costs of high growth firms. However, Jensen (1986) argues that agency conflicts are prevalent in low growth firms because they have substantial free cash flow and have a tendency to overinvest by accepting marginal investment projects with negative net present values. This suggests that for these low growth firms, the board is an important monitoring device. In contrast, high growth firms are not likely to suffer from the free cash flow problem as they are usually short of cash and need to recur to external financing to cover their financing needs. Thus, since these high growth firms are already subject to monitoring when they raise external finance, the role of the board of directors as a monitoring device is likely to be minor.
I use three proxy variables for board structure: number of directors, proportion of nonexecutive directors and the split of the roles of the chief executive officer and chairman. If the board of directors acts as a monitoring device in reducing the free cash flow problem, I expect the board structure to be 'more efficient' in low growth firms, i.e., I expect low growth companies to have a low number of directors, a high proportion of non-executive directors on the board and a high probability of splitting the roles of CEO and chairman compared to high growth firms. In addition, I expect the value of low growth firms to be negatively related to the number of directors but positively associated with the proportion of non-executive directors, the split of the roles of CEO and chairman and the appointment of a non-executive director as a chairman. In contrast, since high growth companies are less prone to agency conflicts that result from the free cash flow problem, they are expected to have a small proportion of nonexecutive directors and a low probability of appointing a non-executive director as a chairman, and the composition of their board should not be an important determinant of their value. If, on the other hand, agency conflicts are driven by the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, then high growth companies are expected to have a more efficient board and a positive relationship between their value and their board structure is expected.
III Data and methodology
I first select all companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange with year ends spanning over the period June 1996 to June 1997. I exclude financial companies, because of the specific characteristics of their financial ratios. This initial sample includes 1,650 non-financial companies. The data on managerial ownership and board structure (number of directors, number of non-executive directors, appointment of a non-executive as a chairman and the split of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer) is collected from companies' financial statements and Extel Financial. 56 The data is collected by hand as it is not in available in machine-readable form and has limited the sample period. 7 I split the companies into high and low growth sub-samples using earnings-to-price (EP) ratio. Companies with an EP ratio below the median are included in the high growth group and companies with an EP ratio equal or above the median are in the low growth group. In order to avoid outliers and discrepancies in the statistics throughout the text, I exclude firms with no EP data. 8 The final sample includes 1,444 listed firms.
I use three main variables to measure the composition of the board: (i) number of directors on the board (#DIR), (ii) the ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of directors in the board (%NED); and (iii) a dummy variable equal to one if the company has split the roles of the chairman and CEO (Split). I also construct a dummy variable, (NeChair), equal to 1 if the chairman was not previously an executive director, 0 otherwise.
9
I use a number of control variables defined in the previous literature to account for any potential effects of external factors on the analysis. First, I control for managerial ownership by using the proportion of shares held by directors. 10 I expect companies with high managerial ownership to be subject to lower agency conflicts. I also use the squared value of managerial ownership to account for the non-linearity relationship between firm value and managerial ownership, as shown by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1995) . Second, I control for block-ownership using the proportion of shares held by all block holders, Block, as a proxy for the incentive of large shareholders to monitor. 11 Third, I use book value of leverage, Blev, defined as the ratio of total debt over the sum of total debt and book value of equity to assess the monitoring role of debt holders. I simulate the results using market value of leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity.
Fourth, I use the log of total assets, LN(TA), to control for size. I simulate the results using log of market value of equity and log of sales. Finally, I use Tobin's Q defined as market value of equity plus total debt over total assets as a proxy for firm value. The results are simulated using industry-adjusted Q (Q ADJ ) defined as Q less industry median Q, and market-to-sales (M/S) defined as market value of equity plus total debt over sales.
IV. Empirical results.
A.
Characteristics of board structure of high and low growth companies Table 1 provides a summary statistic of the board structure variables and the control variables. For both high growth and low growth firms (and for the sample as a whole), the median number of directors is 7. 12 The difference in means and medians between high and low growth firms is not statistically significant. However, the difference in the composition of the board between these two sub-samples is statistically significant. NeChair are not significant suggesting that low growth firms are not more likely to appoint a non-executive director as a chairman.
The rest of the results in Table 1 indicate that high growth companies have the same managerial ownership, block ownership and size (as measured by year-end market value of equity) as low growth companies. The average managerial ownership of about 15% and the median of about 7% are slightly above the 13.3% and 11.5% reported by Short and Keasey (1999) for a sample of 225 UK listed companies in 1988 and in 1992, respectively. 14 In both sub-samples, the average block holders' interest is statistically higher than that of managerial ownership. Finally, as expected, high growth companies have significantly higher Q, adjusted Q and market-to-sales ratio than low growth firms.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The statistical difference in the board composition between high and low growth firms may be due to size differences (the median total assets and sales are higher for low growth firms) and industry factors which are not accounted for in Table 1 . I correct for these potential effects by running a set of logit regressions designed to highlight the board structure differences between the two sub-samples after accounting for size, leverage, ownership, value and industry factors. The results are reported in Table 2 . The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the company is in the high growth sub-sample, zero otherwise. The results indicate that the differences between the two sub-samples in the number of directors (Equation 1) and the probability of appointing a non-executive director as a chairman (Equation 6) are not significant. In contrast, the differences in the composition of the board (number of executives or proportion of non-executive directors) and the probability of splitting the roles of CEO and chairman are statistically significant. In particular, the results show that high growth companies have a higher number (and proportion) of non-executive directors and a higher probability of splitting the roles of CEO and chairman than low growth firms.
The remaining results in Table 2 indicate that high growth firms are not necessarily smaller than low growth firms as the coefficient of size is not always negative and significant.
These results can, however, be due to the relatively high correlation between log of market value of equity and the remaining variables. To overcome this multicolinearity problem, I use log total assets and sales as a proxy for size which are not highly correlated with the remaining explanatory variables. The results, not reported, indicate a negative and significant relationship between the growth dummy and size, suggesting that high growth firms are smaller than low growth firms. The results also indicate that high growth companies have higher leverage than low growth companies. The simulated results using market leverage are qualitatively similar to those reported above. These results do not provide support for Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) who show that high growth firms have low leverage. Finally, as expected, the coefficient of Q is always positive and significant.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 . The results are qualitatively similar. Table 3 shows that for both sets of companies, firm value is negatively related to the number of directors (Equations 1 and 6). These results are consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996 , Eisenberg et al, 1998 and suggest that large boards do not create value because their size exacerbates the free riding problem among directors vis-à-vis the monitoring of management. Equations (2) and (7) indicate that for both high and low growth firms, the relationship between firm value and number of executive directors is negative and significant.
B. Board structure and firm value
In contrast, the relationship between firm value and proportion of non-executive directors is negative but not significant for high growth firms and positive and significant for low growth firms. There are two implications from these results. First, the negative relationship between firm value and number of directors documented in previous studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996) is likely to apply to only executive directors. Second, the monitoring role of non-executive directors differs between the two groups of companies. Low growth firms gain by having a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board. In contrast, the value of high growth companies is not affected by the presence of non-executive directors. Thus, the results of Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2000) that there is no noticeable relation between the proportion of outside directors and firm value appear to apply only to high growth firms.
The results may, however, be subject to endogeneity problem of board composition. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that poor performance leads to increases in board independence. In cross-sectional analysis this effect is likely to lead to a negative relation between firm performance and the proportion of non-executive directors. This effect is not likely to bias the results as for low growth firm (i.e., companies that are likely to have a low performance), the relationship between Q and proportion of non-executive directors is positive and significant. I also correct for endogeneity by lagging the dependent and the control variables. The results, not reported for space reasons, are qualitatively the same.
The relationship between firm value and the split dummy or the appointment of a nonexecutive as a chairman also depends on firm's growth prospects. Equation (4), Table 3 , shows that the coefficient of the split dummy is negative and significant suggesting that high growth companies that split the roles of CEO and chairman have actually lower value that companies that combine the two roles. The appointment of a non-executive director as a chairman does not affect firm value. These results imply that, since high growth companies do not suffer from the free cash flow problem, the split of the roles of CEO and chairman may only result in high wages and co-ordination costs. In contrast, Equations (9) and (10) show that, for low growth firms, the relationship between firm value and the split dummy and the appointment of a nonexecutive as a chairman is positive and statistically significant. The results suggest that low growth firms that split the roles of CEO and chairman or appoint a non-executive director as a chairman suffer less from the free cash flow problem. As a result they have a higher value than companies that combine the two roles. Table 3 also shows that for high growth firms the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership is curve-linear and highly significant. For example in Equation (1) the coefficient of management ownership is 0.025 (t = 4.67) and that of its square is -3.13E-4 (t = -3.98). The results suggest that firm value is optimised when managerial ownership reaches 40%. 15 In contrast, for low growth firms the coefficient of managerial ownership is positive and significant but that of it square value is not significant. The results suggest that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is linear, implying that managers are not entrenched when they hold large stakes and as managerial ownership increases, the free cash flow problems are mitigated and firm value increases.
In terms of external corporate governance mechanisms, Table 3 shows that the relationship between block ownership and firm value is negative and significant for high growth firms but weak for low growth firms. To the extent that these block holders are pension funds, the largest investor category in the UK, these results are consistent with Faccio and Lasfer (2000) who show that pension fund investment is negatively related to firm value. The results also show that leverage is negatively associated with value for both low and high growth firms. These results are not consistent with McConnell and Servaes (1995) who find that leverage is positively related to value for low growth firms, but negatively related to value for high growth companies. However, the coefficients of the debt variable of high growth firms are larger than those of low growth firms. For high growth firms the impact of debt financing is about four times more negative than for low growth firms. 16 The results suggest that the monitoring role of block holders and bondholders is not effective.
[Insert Table 3 here]
C. Robustness
In this section, I briefly describe the results of some of the robustness checks of the findings. One question is whether the regression results in Table 3 are shaped by the choice of the proxy variable for firm value, Q. I re-estimate the results using Q adjusted for industry median, Q ADJ and market-to-sales, M/S. The coefficients of the board structure variables are reported in Table 4 . As in Table 3 , five regressions are run for both high growth and low growth firms. Table 4 reports the coefficients of each board structure variable obtained from each separate regression. The results of the control variables are not reported as they are qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 3 .
Panel A reports the results using industry adjusted Q as the dependent variable. The results mimic those reported in Table 3 . For high growth firms, the number of directors (#DIR) and executive directors (#ED), and the split dummy are all negatively and significantly related to firm value. The proportion of non-executive directors and the appointment of a nonexecutive director as a chairman are not statistically significant, suggesting that non-executive directors do not play a significant role in mitigating the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders of high growth companies. In contrast, for low growth companies, board structure has a significant impact on firm value. The results show that the value of low growth firms increases when the proportion of non-executive directors is high, the roles of CEO and chairman are split and when a non-executive director is appointed as a chairman, and decreases with the board size and the number of executive directors.
The results based on market-to-sales (M/S) as a measure of firm value, reported in Panel B, show that none of the board structure variables affects value of high growth companies. However, for the case of low growth firms, the relationship between firm value and the number of directors and executive directors on the board is negative and significant while firm value increases with the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the appointment of a non-executive director as a chairman. As above, these results suggest that board structure is more important in reducing the agency conflict of low growth firms but does not affect the value of high growth firms.
The above sample is based on only 1996/97 annual reports because the time series detailed data on board characteristics, managerial ownership and block ownership is not available in machine readable form. However, the results may be sample dependent. To overcome this potential problem, I collected data on board structure, managerial ownership, block ownership and the remaining financial data, as above, from Extel Financial for 764 firms with 1998/99 year-ends. Data on NeChair is not available. I replicated the results in Table 1 to 3 using this new data. The results, not reported in full for space reasons, are summarised below.
The summary statistics (Table 1) indicate that the average (median) number of directors of high growth companies of 7.56 (7.00) is significantly higher than the 6.91 (7.00) of low growth companies (t of differences in mean is 3.68 and Mann Whitney p-value is 0.00).
However, in contrast to the results in Table 1 , both groups have the same number of executive directors of 4, but the difference is due to the higher number of non-executive directors in high growth firms (3.46 compared to 2.96, t of differences in mean is 4.13). As in Table 1 , the proportion of non-executive directors in 1998/99 of high growth firms of 45% is significantly higher than that of 42% of low growth firms. There is also evidence that high growth companies in 1998/99 have lower block ownership and higher market value of equity than low growth firms. The remaining results in Table 1 are qualitatively similar.
The replicated Table 2 using the 1998/99 data indicated that high growth companies have a higher number of directors (t = 2.97), higher number of non-executive directors (t = 3.19) and a higher proportion of non-executive directors (t = 1.83). The coefficients of number of executive directors (#ED) and split dummy are not significant. As in Table 2 , the coefficients of managerial ownership and block ownership are not significant while Q is positive and significant. However, unlike Table 2 , leverage (Blev) and size (ln(ME)) are not significant.
The results of Table 3 are summarised in Panel C and D of Table 4 . As in Panels A and B, I report only the coefficients of the board structure variables. The coefficients of the remaining variables are similar to Table 3 . In Panel C, the dependent variable is Q. The results
show that, for high growth firms, with the exception of the negative relationship between firm value and the number of directors, none of the remaining board structure variables is significant. In contrast, for low growth firms, firm value is negatively related to the number of directors and the number of executive directors but positively related to the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board. The split dummy is not significant. It is also interesting to note the substantial difference in the proportion of variation in firm value explained by the independent variables. For high growth firms, the board structure variables (and the other explanatory variables in Table 3 [Insert Table 4 here]
V. Conclusions
In this paper I analyse the relationship between board structure and firm value using a large sample of UK quoted non-financial companies. The hypothesis that firms with high agency costs should have an efficient board that includes a large proportion of non-executive directors and where the roles of CEO and chairman are split is tested. However, the relationship depends on whether the agency costs are driven by the free cash flow problem or the information asymmetry. For the former case low growth firms are expected to have a more efficient board, while if agency costs reflect the level of information asymmetry, then high growth firms are expected to have an efficient board.
Using data for 1444 UK non-financial companies in 1996/97 and 764 companies in 1998/99, I find significant differences in the board structure and in the relationship between firm value and board structure between the high growth and low growth firms. Low growth firms have a higher number of directors but a lower proportion of non-executive directors on the board and are less likely to split the roles of CEO and chairman than high growth companies. For these low growth firms, I find a positive relationship between firm value and the proportion of non-executive directors and the appointment of a non-executive director as a chairman. In contrast, for high growth firms, the relationship between board structure and firm value is weak. These results hold even after accounting for size and other monitoring and incentive mechanisms and appear to be inconsistent with the monitoring role of the board of directors.
The difference between the two groups of firms is also observed in the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership. The results show that for high growth firms, the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership is non-linear and optimised at 40%
level. In contrast, for low growth firms the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is positive, suggesting that as managerial ownership increases, the free cash flow problems are mitigated and firm value increases.
The results imply that only low growth companies benefit fully from both internal corporate governance mechanisms (board structure and managerial ownership) which aim at reducing the agency costs resulting form the free cash flow problems. The composition of the board for the high growth companies is likely to reflect the need to provide a good corporate governance image to be able to raise additional finance in the market since these companies have severe information asymmetries and capital constraints. Therefore, imposing the same board structure for all companies independently of their specific characteristics and needs is likely to reduce the value of firms that may be forced to depart from corporate governance structures which have been successful.
Although the results highlighted the importance of growth options on the design of internal corporate governance system, further work is required to fully understand some issues reported in this paper. In particular, the results point to a space for a further improvement in the structure of boards of low growth firms as the weak relationship between board structure and value could imply a high demand for more capable managers, instead of a relatively simple restructuring of the board. It is also important to understand further whether board structure of high growth companies reduces the information asymmetry, especially at a time of raising external financing. In addition, the paper did not deal with the question of whether boards are dominated by managers and whether directors' appointments are determined by the CEO. The extent to which these additional issues will strengthen or alter the results of this paper is the subject of further research. The sample includes 1444 UK non-financial companies with year-ends in 1996/97. High (Low) Growth companies are companies with Earning Price ratio below (above) the market median. The board structure variables are: #DIR is number of directors in the board; #DIR (#NED) is the number of (non-) executive directors in the board, (%NED) is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board, % Split is the proportion of companies that split the roles of chairman and CEO, NeChair is the proportion of companies that appointed a non-executive director as a chairman. The control variables are: Mgmt, the proportion of equity held by managers; Block, the proportion of shares above 3% held by largest shareholders other than directors, Blev the ratio of total debt over total debt plus shareholders' funds; Mlev the ratio of total debt over market value of equity plus total debt; ME, market value of equity at year end, TA, total assets. Firm value variables are: Q, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over total assets; Q ADJ , the Q ratio less industry median, and M/S, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over sales. t-sat is the t-statistics for differences in means between low and high growth firms, MW is the Mann Whitney p-value to test for differences in medians. (***), (**), (*): Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The board structure variables are: #DIR is number of directors in the board; #DIR (#NED) is the number of (non-) executive directors in the board, (%NED) is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board, % Split is the proportion of companies that split the roles of chairman and CEO, NeChair is the proportion of companies that appointed a non-executive director as a chairman. The control variables are: Mgmt, the proportion of equity held by managers; Block, the proportion of shares above 3% held by largest shareholders other than directors, Blev the ratio of total debt over total debt plus shareholders' funds; ME, market value of equity at year end, Q, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over total assets. All regressions include industry dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses. (***), (**), (*): Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 13.1 0.00 22   Table 3 : Impact of board structure on firm value The sample includes 1444 UK non-financial firms with year-ends in 1996/97. The dependent variable is Q, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over total assets. High (Low) Growth Companies are companies with Earning Price ratio below (above) the market median. The board structure variables are: #DIR is number of directors; #ED is the number of executive directors, %NED is the proportion of non-executive directors, Split is a dummy variable equal to one if company splits the roles of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise; NeChair is a dummy variable equal to one if companies appointed a non-executive director as a chairman. The control variables are: Mgmt, the proportion of equity held by managers; Block, the proportion of shares above 3% held by largest shareholders other than directors, Blev the ratio of total debt over total debt plus shareholders' funds and ME, market value of equity at year end. All regressions include industry dummies. The t-statistics are in parentheses. (***), (**), (*): Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. High Growth Companies Low Growth Companies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 4 : Robustness Check The table shows the regressions coefficients of the board structure variables using Equations (1) to (10) in Table 3 with control variables and industry dummies. The coefficients of the control variables are similar to Table 3 , thus not reported. Low (High) Growth Companies are companies with Earning Price ratio above (below) the market median. #DIR is number of directors; #ED is the number of executive directors, %NED is the proportion of non-executive directors, Split is a dummy variable equal to one if firm splits the roles of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise; NeChair is a dummy variable equal to one if firms appointed a non-executive director as a chairman. In Panel A. the dependent variable is Q ADJ , Q ratio (the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over total assets) less industry median. In Panels B and D. the dependent variable is the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over sales. In Panel C. the dependent variable is the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of long and short-term debt over total assets. Panels C and D. are based on the 1998/99 data for 764 UK firms. The t-statistics are in parentheses. (***), (**), (*): Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 12 This is lower than the 12 reported by Yermack (1996) and 13 by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) in the US. These two studies have, however, concentrated on larger companies. 13 For the sample as a whole, about 43% of directors are non-executives. This is consistent with Monks and Minow (1995) who report that the proportion of outside directors in the UK of 42%. However, an earlier study (Bank of England, 1983) showed that the average proportion of non-executive directors in the board of UK quoted firms was 33% in 1982
(pre-Cadbury period). Dahya et al., (2001) report evidence that a large number of UK firms changed their board structures after 1993 to comply with the Cadbury Guidelines. This could explain the rise in the proportion of non-executive directors in my sample.
14 However, this proportion is different from that reported in US studies. For Fortune 500, the average holding is between 10.6% and 12.4% (e.g., Jensen and Warner, 1988 , Morck, et al, 1988 , and Cho, 1998 . For a sample of US middle-size firms, Denis and Kruse (1999) find that officers and directors hold on average (median) 20% (11.3%) of shares. For the whole sample of firms listed in the US, Holderness et al (1999) find an average managerial holding of 21% in 1995. However, for NYSE firms, the average holding is 12.2%. 15 The inflexion points are found as a solution to the following equation: 16 F-tests reveal that these differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
